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discrimination in employment. The Article starts with evidence of age 
discrimination on work platforms particularly with regard to design 
elements, such as the availability of age-related proxies. The article then 
describes how these platforms use practices that redline, cull, or dissuade 
older job applicants. It then presents the challenging legal issues raised by 
the mediation of discriminatory employment practices by an information 
intermediary in the form of a platform, notably the problems of meeting the 
burden of proof and the assignation of liability. The Article then puts forth a 
three-part proposal to combat age discrimination in the face of platform 
authoritarianism. These proposals include: 1) reinforcement of the disparate 
impact cause of action for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) via codification; 2) education for employers regarding the use of 
ageist language in job ads; and 3) new EEOC guidelines for criteria 
documentation and data retention for job advertisement, recruitment, and 
hiring platforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, the comedian Bill Maher proclaimed that “ageism is the last 
acceptable prejudice in America.”1 While this sentiment has not been 
affirmed by the research of several legal scholars, age discrimination in 
employment has been an important preoccupation of legal scholarship.2 In 
1. Greg Gilman, Bill Maher Rips ‘Shallow’ American Culture for Allowing ‘Ageism’ to Impact 
Politics, THE WRAP (Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.thewrap.com/bill-maher-rips-shallow-american-culture-
for-allowing-ageism-to-impact-politics/ [https://perma.cc/U4M3-YHC6]; see also Nicole Karlis, Time to 
rethink how we talk about older people, SALON (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/03/31/time-
to-rethink-how-we-talk-about-the-elderly/ (in which Dr. Bill Thomas, author of What are Old People 
For?, observes that “Aging is the last form of bigotry you can speak of in public.”). 
2. A survey of legal scholarship on age discrimination did not characterize it as an acceptable 
social prejudice, however, several law review articles address the problem of age discrimination in 
employment. See, for example, Laurie A. McCann, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at 50: 
When Will It Become A “Real” Civil Rights Statute?, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 89, 94-95 (2017); Pnina 
Alon-Shenker, Legal Barriers to Age Discrimination in Hiring Complaints, 39 DALHOUSIE L.J. 289, 313 
(2016); Debra Lyn Bassett, Silencing Our Elders, 15 NEV. L.J. 519, 527 (2015); Michael 
Harper, Reforming the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Proposals and Prospects, 16 EM. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 13 (2012); Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 217 (2007); Aida Marie Alaka, Corporate Reorganizations, Job Layoffs, and Age Discrimination: 
Has Smith v. City of Jackson Substantially Expanded the Rights of Older Workers Under the ADEA?, 70 
ALB. L. REV. 143 (2006); Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact under the Age Discrimination in 
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the same year as Maher’s assertion, there were reports of Silicon Valley tech 
workers (some in their mid-twenties) resorting to plastic surgery to maintain 
what they perceived as the mandatory youthful appearance for job retention.3 
Moreover, a 2018 ProPublica investigation uncovered that IBM may have 
engaged in systematic and internally orchestrated age discrimination by 
laying off a large number of older U.S. employees.4 According to 
ProPublica’s estimates, “IBM has eliminated more than 20,000 American 
employees ages 40 and over, about 60 percent of its estimated total U.S. job 
cuts” in the last five years.5  
The perception that youth is a requisite for employment in Silicon Valley 
is confirmed by statements from industry leaders. For example, in 2007, 
Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, told an audience at Stanford 
University, “I want to stress the importance of being young and technical.”6 
Zuckerberg added: “Young people are just smarter.”7 If such casual ageism 
pervades Silicon Valley culture, then consider how these ageist perceptions 
might influence hiring practices, especially as evinced by job advertisement, 
recruitment, and job postings on hiring platforms. 
Despite the five decades since the passage of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”)8 – a law meant to protect older workers in the 
labor market – age discrimination in employment has not abated in recent 
years.9 The law was passed in recognition of the social phenomenon of age 
Employment Act of 1967, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1(2004); Judith D. Fischer, Public Policy and 
the Tyranny of the Bottom Line in the Termination of Older Workers, 53 S.C. L. REV. 211 (2002).  
3. Noam Scheiber, The Brutal Ageism of Tech, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/117088/silicons-valleys-brutal-ageism. 
4. Peter Gosselin & Ariana Tobin, Cutting ‘Old Heads’ at IBM, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://features.propublica.org/ibm/ibm-age-discrimination-american-workers/ (“The company reacted 
with a strategy that, in the words of one confidential planning document, would ‘correct seniority mix.’”) 
5. Id.
6. Andrew Ross, In Silicon Valley, age can be a curse, SF GATE (Aug. 20, 2013), 
https://www.sfgate.com/business/bottomline/article/In-Silicon-Valley-age-can-be-a-curse-4742365.php. 
7. Id. 
8. On December 15, 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) to prohibit and eradicate systemic age discrimination that older workers faced in the workplace. 
See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.  
9. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) (2017), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/adea.cfm [hereinafter EEOC, CHARGES FILED] 
(showing no significant decrease in discrimination claims each year between 1997-2017). “Age 
discrimination claims are on the rise in both volume of cases filed and size of verdicts. Given the current 
economic landscape, widespread layoff announcements, and the aging boomer generation, that trend 
seems unlikely to abate anytime soon.” Carla J. Rozycki & Patricia A. Bronte, A Game of Numbers: ADEA 
Compliance and Litigation, 1 LAB. LAW. 18, 203 (2002). See also, Jana E. Cuellar, The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act: Handling the Element of Intent in Summary Judgment Motions, 38 
EMORY L. J. 523, 524 (1989); Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: 
Where It’s Been, Where It Is Today, Where It’s Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 591-96 (1997); Anne Noel 
Occhialino & Daniel Vail, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 Symposium: 
Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 682-83, 687 (2005) 
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discrimination in hiring, wherein arbitrary age limits for job applicants lead 
to greater unemployment rates for older workers.10 Thus, the ADEA offers 
labor market protections for workers over forty years of age.11 The ADEA 
prohibits employers and employment agencies from age discrimination in job 
advertising, recruiting, hiring, and other employment opportunities.12 In 
addition, the ADEA makes it unlawful to send or publish employment ads 
that discriminate or indicate a preference or limitation based on age.13 Yet, 
statistics indicate that age discrimination is thriving in the digital age, with 
20,857 age discrimination complaints filed with the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in 2016 alone.14 
Furthermore, there is the widespread suspicion that online job ads may 
be excluding older workers. In a 2017 study from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco,15 researchers created 40,000 fictitious resumes for job 
applicants to uncover statistical evidence of age discrimination.16 Although 
the ages of the applicants were not explicitly listed on the resumes, each 
applicant’s age could be implicitly derived from the included high school 
graduation year.17 The study revealed evidence of age bias among several 
low-skilled jobs categories such as sales, administrators, and janitors. For 
instance, for older male applicants, callbacks fell from 20.89 percent to 14.70 
percent—indicating an almost 30 percent decrease in callback rate.18 
However, older women applicants had an even more precipitous drop in 
callbacks—a 47 percent lower callback rate for women in administrative jobs 
and a 36 percent lower callback rate for women in sales jobs compared to 
younger applicants—indicating the presence of even stronger intersectional 
age and gender bias.19 
In addition to audit studies that revealed the potential for platforms to 
enable age bias, another recent study makes clear the connection between 
10. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621; 631(a)–(b) (2012). But note that some jurisdictions have passed laws to 
include workers under age 40. 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (b), (e) (2012).
13. Id.
14. See Austin O’Connor, Bias Toward Older Workers on the Rise as Age Discrimination Goes 
Online, THE MILWAUKEE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 2018), 
http://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/syndicated/bias-toward-older-workers-on-the-rise-as-age-
discrimination-goes-online/; see also EEOC, CHARGES FILED, supra note 9.  
15. David Neumark, et. al., Age Discrimination and Hiring of Older Workers, FEDERAL RESERVE 
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platforms and age discrimination in employment recruitment on platforms.20 
The investigative study by ProPublica and The New York Times concluded 
that dozens of employers—among them Verizon, Amazon, Goldman Sachs, 
Target, and Facebook—targeted applicants by age and excluded individuals 
over 40,21 a forbidden action under the ADEA.22 Specifically, the ProPublica 
investigation obtained a job advertisement database which revealed that 
Facebook ads can be and are targeted to precise age groups, allowing 
employers to recruit job applicants that are below a certain age.23 For 
example, the obtained jobs ads show that in a search for “part-time package 
handlers,” Facebook enabled the United Parcel Service to run an 
advertisement that targeted only individuals between the ages of 18 to 24.24 
Another job ad uncovered by ProPublica showed the insurance company 
State Farm targeted only job applicants between 19 and 35.25 
This age-targeted advertising is the subject of a recent class action 
complaint filed against Facebook.26 That complaint lays out the causal link 
between age discrimination and how job ads are advertised on social media 
and job recruitment platforms. The complaint was filed on behalf of the 
Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) against several companies, 
including Amazon and T-Mobile, and a class of employers across the 
country.27 The primary allegation is that the named companies and the 
defendant class are shielding older workers from receiving job ads by 
“specifically targeting their employment ads to younger workers via 
Facebook’s ad platform.”28 The complaint alleges that Facebook’s 
involvement in this practice “is not simply that of an intermediary that 
operates a platform to develop, sell, and deliver ads to Facebook users.”29 
Rather, “Facebook has used its own ad platform to recruit job applicants to 
work at Facebook, and Facebook routinely used the same discriminatory age 
filters to exclude older workers from seeing Facebook’s own employment 
ads for a range of positions” in the company.30  This distinction, that 
Facebook is not merely acting as a third-party provider, is important. Section 
20. Julia Angwin, et. al., Facebook Job Ads Raise Concerns About Age Discrimination, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/business/facebook-job-ads.html.  
21. Id. 
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (b), (e).
23. See Julia Angwin et al., supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Id. 
26. Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. T-Mobile, 
Inc., No. 17-cv-07232 (Dec. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9FHQ-UACR]. 
27. Id. at ¶ 1. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at ¶ 22. 
30. Id. 
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230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)31 holds that ISPs (that is, 
internet service providers) such as Facebook, cannot be held liable for user-
generated content where the provider did not create or develop the content at 
issue. Following the same logic, some courts have ruled that when online 
platforms are manipulating content they could be considered content 
developers under the CDA and thus exempt from the liability protections of 
Section 230.32 
Platforms are generally understood as services that “process (meta)data 
through algorithms and formatted protocols” before presenting the 
interpreted information to third parties.33 While this definition of platforms is 
expansive enough to include internet-enabled infrastructure for hiring and 
management, the layperson’s conceptualization of platforms is largely 
restricted to one genre: social media platforms. Most Americans are familiar 
with, and regularly use, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
etc. And thus far, most legal scholarship on platforms have focused on 
problems associated with social media.34 Increasingly, Americans are also 
interacting with recruitment platforms such as LinkedIn. However, work 
platforms have been largely exempt from the public discussion and 
understanding of employment discrimination. Few researchers have studied 
how these automated hiring platforms work in concert with social media to 
cull or redline older job applicants via unlawful practices. 
Part I of this Article details the design and use features through which 
platforms might enable, facilitate, or contribute to age discrimination. 
Notably, regarding the design features, I note how platforms use proxies both 
to bar older job applicants from access to advertised jobs and also to glean 
prohibited age information. In Part II, I observe how antidiscrimination law, 
such as the ADEA, may be inadequate to curtail design features that enable 
31. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
32. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the cases.
33. JOSE VAN DIJCK, THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
29 (2013). 
34. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race 
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017) (noting racial discrimination on 
Airbnb platform); Alexander Tsesis, Symposium: Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 605 (2017) (discussing terrorist forums on social media platforms); Catherine 
Tremble, Note, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social Networks’ Use of Machine-Learning 
Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825 (2017) (discussing § 230 immunity and whether machine learning 
algorithms fall under such protection); Brian Mund, Note, Social Media Searches and the Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 238 (2017) (discussing the reasonable expectation of 
privacy on social media platforms); James Long, Note, #Fired: The National Labor Relations Act and 
Employee Outbursts in the Age of Social Media, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1217 (2015) (noting ambiguity 
surrounding employee posts as concerted activity); Shelby Sklar, Note, The Impact of Social Media on 
the Legislative Process: How the Speech or Debate Clause Could be Interpreted, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC. 
POL’Y 389 (2015) (discussing Speech and Debate Clause and the use of social media in the legislative 
process); Amy J. St. Eve et al., #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 64 (2014) (discussing implications of social media use by jurors). 
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platform age discrimination in employment. In Part III, I put forth a three-
part proposal to combat age discrimination in the face of platform 
authoritarianism. By platform authoritarianism, I refer to our present social 
position vis-à-vis platforms, wherein creators of platforms demand that we 
engage with those platforms solely “on their dictated terms, without regard 
for established laws and business ethics.”35 My proposals for combating age 
discrimination on online platforms include: 1) reinforcing the disparate 
impact cause of action for the ADEA via codification; 2) educating 
employers regarding the use of ageist language in job ads; and 3) applying 
new EEOC guidelines regarding design and documentation requirements for 
job advertisement, recruitment, and hiring platforms. 
I. PLATFORM DESIGN & AGE DISCRIMINATION
Although hiring algorithms have been touted as an efficiency tool for a 
now digitized workplace,36 there are some indications that the growing use of 
platforms for recruitment and hiring is contributing to age discrimination. 
Since 1999, the number of age discrimination charges filed with the EEOC 
has risen by 47 percent.37 Given this increase in the number of claims, age 
discrimination has been established as one of the most common forms of 
employment discrimination.38 But why have claims of discrimination risen 
so drastically over such a short period of time? 
One explanation is that the average age of the working population has 
been gradually rising. In fact, workers aged 65 and older make up the fastest 
35. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Facebook Users Aren’t the Reason Facebook is in Trouble Now, WASH. POST,
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/03/23/facebook-users-
arent-the-reason-facebook-is-in-trouble-now/ [https://perma.cc/576A-NBL8]. 
36. See, e.g., Vivian Giang, Why New Hiring Algorithms are More Efficient—Even if They Filter 
Out Qualified Candidates, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Oct. 25, 2013 10:51 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-its-ok-that-employers-filter-out-qualified-candidates-2013-10
[https://perma.cc/7S6Y-373T] (quoting Steve Goodman, CEO of job site Bright.com as stating, “the 
Internet has democratized the entire application process. Anybody can go online and spray and pray their 
resume all over the place. That’s why it’s actually OK if increasingly complicated algorithms accidentally 
filter out some qualified candidates in order to identify the really good ones . . . . People do fall through 
the cracks, there’s no question about it. But people don’t fall through the cracks with every job. They fall 
through the cracks with one job here, one job there.”) 
37. See EEOC, CHARGES FILED, supra note 9. 
38. “Older workers and those who seek employment after the age of 65 have historically confronted 
intractable institutional and social barriers. . . Negative societal stereotypes about older adults are still 
prevalent and most elders report experiencing or witnessing instances of age-based discrimination.” 
Jessica Z. Rothenberg & Daniel S. Gardener, Protecting Older Workers: The Failure of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 1 J. Soc. & Soc. Welf. 38, 10 (2011). See also, Judith J. 
Johnson, Reasonable Factors other than Age: The Emerging Specter of Ageist Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 49, 53-5 (2009); Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: 
Resusciate the Reasonable Factors Other than Age Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 1399, 1399-1401 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination 
Really Age Discrimination: The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 782 (1997). 
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growing segment of the working-age population in the United States.39 This 
trend is expected to continue into the future, as well, with 31 percent of non-
retired adults stating that they intend to remain employed until age 68 or 
older.40 Additionally, the average age of retirement within the population has 
risen to 62, up from 57 when polls were taken in the 1990s.41 Although this 
increase in the population of older workers and their later retirement could 
explain, in part, why there are more claims of age discrimination than in the 
past, this demographic explanation may not account entirely for the drastic 
rise in recent claims. In addition to an older worker population, I argue that 
online platforms, and the ways in which those platforms are deployed, have 
contributed to the rise of age discrimination in employment. 
A. Proxies for Age Discrimination in Advertisement Platforms
One mechanism driving the rise in age discrimination claims is that job 
advertisement platforms, both in their design and function, allow for the 
substitution of age-related proxies in advertising language. The use of ageist 
language in job advertisements is not a novel problem. For example, in the 
1975 case of Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Services, the Fourth Circuit 
ruled that the use of the term “recent graduate” in a job advertisement was 
not “merely informational,” but instead deterred older workers from 
applying. Thus, such language violated the ADEA.42  In the 1996 case Boyd 
v. City of Wilmington, the Eastern District of North Carolina was faced with
a similar question when a plaintiff brought an action against the city of
Wilmington for indicating that “candidates for MPA or MSIR degrees [were]
preferred.”43 The plaintiff, William Boyd, claimed that the language in this
job advertisement, because it referred to newly created degrees, violated the
ADEA’s provision that it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to publish, or
cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to
employment by such an employer . . . indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on age.”44 The Court held, however,
that Boyd had not been able to show “discriminatory intent” and had failed
39. Id. at 1. 
40. Lydia Saad, Three in 10 U.S. Workers Foresee Working Past Retirement Age, GALLUP NEWS,
(May 13, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/191477/three-workers-foresee-working-past-retirement-
age.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NF3-AC5G].  
41. Rebecca Riffkin, Average U.S. Retirement Age Rises to 62, GALLUP NEWS, (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/168707/average-retirement-age-rises.aspx  [https://perma.cc/VTK7-ZNV3]; 
see Katie Rockwood, Hiring in the Age of Ageism, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT., (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0218/pages/hiring-in-the-age-of-ageism.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4JQ4-UMYB] (explaining that these statistics, which show a steadily increasing average 
age of the American worker, can be viewed largely as a result of the financial challenges and employment 
gaps that many workers endured during the Great Recession of 2008). 
42. Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Serv., Inc., 529 F. 2d 760, 766 (4th Cir. 1975).
43. Boyd v. City of Wilmington, 943 F. Supp. 585, 587, 590-91 (E.D.N.C. 1996). 
44. Id. at 590 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1985)).
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to show that the advertisement had “exposed an inclination for the younger 
generation or actually resulted in disparate treatment of older workers.”45 In 
comparison, today’s job advertisement platforms allow for some 
sophistication in how age discrimination might be achieved. While the term 
“recent graduate” might be regarded as inarguably ageist, an online ad that 
lists a requisite skill set (albeit a new skill set that older graduates might not 
have) may more easily escape legal scrutiny while still effectuating an age 
discriminatory result. 
Technological advancements have allowed ageist job advertisements to 
take on even more subtle dimensions. One example is the development of 
Facebook Affinity Groups. These groups comprise “socially active” 
Facebook users of different demographics which allow advertisers to target 
messages.46 With Affinity Groups, clients or advertisers can choose to narrow 
or “refine [their] audience,” opting to limit their ads to certain people.47 More 
specifically, these Affinity Groups can allow companies to focus their ads on 
prospective applicants in specific age bands, such as “ages 18 to 38.”48 
While this data often helps business owners to refine their audiences and 
advertise to individuals who might be more likely to become customers, this 
kind of digital sorting also holds great potential for discrimination. In fact, in 
a recent class action suit against Facebook, plaintiffs have alleged that many 
large companies engaged in widespread age discrimination in employment 
advertising, recruitment processing, and hiring due to their use of these online 
affinity groups.49 The plaintiffs’ formal complaint alleges that major 
American employers routinely exclude older workers from receiving their 
employment and recruiting ads on Facebook, thereby denying older workers 
equal opportunity for jobs.50 Additionally, plaintiffs allege that the 
companies’ decisions to exclude older workers from seeing their ads were 
deliberate, as the companies targeted only younger workers—or left out 
Affinity Groups for potential recruits in older age ranges.51 
The Communications Workers of America allege that this practice of 
“age-based targeting” actively denies job opportunities to potentially 
qualified individuals, solely on the basis of age.52 Furthermore, the plaintiffs 
argue that online platforms such as Facebook have become the dominant 
45. See id. at 592. 
46.  See U.S. Hispanic Affinity on Facebook, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/a/us-hispanic-affinity-audience (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
47. Id. 
48. Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 11. 
49. Amended Complaint ¶ 20, Bradley v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 17-cv-07232-BLF (N.D. Cal. 
May 29, 2018), https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com/sites/default/files/documents/og-cwa-
complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSM8-UPG9]. 
50. Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 11. 
51. Id. ¶ 7. 
52. Amended Complaint, supra note 49, ¶ 22. 
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force for recruiting in the national labor market.53 Thus, by eliminating older 
workers from seeing their ad campaigns, companies significantly reduce the 
potential job opportunities for these older workers.54  While the use of ageist 
language in ads was the primary problem in the past, the targeting capabilities 
of platforms now enable employers to ensure that older workers are 
effectively screened out of many applicant pools. 
B. Proxies for Age Discrimination in Automated Hiring Platforms
Much like how platform technology has transformed ageism in job 
advertisements, automated hiring has changed how age discrimination is 
effectuated during the hiring process. Automated hiring platforms usually 
provide resume screening.55 This feature is extremely appealing for recruiters 
who otherwise would spend many hours screening for a single hire.56 
However, the value of any time and labor saved must be balanced against the 
potential discriminatory impacts on older candidates. Previously, the 
discriminatory impacts of automated hiring platforms on older applicants 
have largely gone unnoticed. One explanation is that age is not always a 
salient variable of job discrimination for employers to consider. In fact, while 
64 percent of CEOs report to have solid diversity and inclusion initiatives in 
place, a mere 8 percent state that they include age as part of their efforts.57  
This lack of interest in curbing age discrimination means that barriers to 
inclusion for older workers are often overlooked. One barrier to inclusion is 
the redlining of older workers into inferior job positions, such as part-time 
jobs. For example, while the job site Indeed.com at one point claimed to have 
over 16 million jobs listed worldwide, it was reported that the site also had a 
specific category titled “Part Time Jobs, Senior Citizen Jobs.”58 Not only does 
this sort of category separate out “senior citizen jobs” from all seemingly 
“regular” jobs, which may in itself be discriminatory, it also links “senior 
citizen jobs” with “part-time jobs,” likely diminishing the number of hours 
that older applicants might be able to work when they do find a job. Another 
problem arises from the availability of jobs within the category, which 
53. Amended Complaint ¶ 9, Bradley v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 17-cv-07232-BLF (N.D. Cal. May 
29, 2018), https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com/sites/default/files/documents/og-cwa-complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NSM8-UPG9]. 
54. Id. ¶ 10. 
55. See Ji-A Min, Three Ways Automation Will Change Recruiting Forever, TALENT CULTURE,
(May 3, 2017), https://talentculture.com/3-ways-recruitment-automation-will-change-recruiting-forever/. 
56. See id. (recruiters “spend an average of 23 hours screening resumes for a single hire”).
57. See 18th Annual Global CEO Survey, A Marketplace Without Boundaries?, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INTERNATIONAL, 31 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-
survey/2015/assets/pwc-18th-annual-global-ceo-survey-jan-2015.pdf. 
58. Bob Sullivan, Online Job Sites May Block Older Workers, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/10/online-job-sites-may-block-older-workers.html. 
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contains a mere 158,000 positions of the boasted 16 million total positions.59 
At one time, only 0.9% of jobs on Indeed.com were geared specifically 
towards older workers, even though these workers make up a much larger 
proportion of the working-age population. However, Indeed.com is not alone 
in segregating “older applicants” in this manner. Monster.com also has a 
special home page for older workers titled “Careers at 50+.”60 Categories like 
these act as ageist digital redlining, guiding older applicants to limited jobs 
and signaling that only certain age groups should apply. 
Other hiring platforms have user interfaces that may be used to cull older 
job applicants. For example, some online hiring platforms have drop-down 
menus that ask applicants to input their birth dates which are later submitted 
with their applications. However, some job applicants have discovered that 
these drop-down menus only allow for birth years since 1980 to be 
submitted.61 To exacerbate the issue, many platforms will not allow the 
applicant to submit the application without an answer to the age question.62 
In one case, a 70-year-old Illinois man filed a complaint with the office of 
the Illinois Attorney General when he discovered that he was unable to use 
an online resume building tool because of built-in age restrictions.63 The 
result of the complaint was a request for information by Attorney General 
Lisa Madigan to several automated hiring platforms including Monster.com, 
Ladders.com, Indeed.com, and several others.64 All of their websites had 
varying age cutoffs limiting the age of any applicant.65 
C. Proxies for Age Discrimination in Recruitment Platforms
Recruitment platforms are also rife with age-related proxies and ageist 
euphemisms, particularly in the manner in which some companies present 
their work cultures and open job positions online. This is a problem, for 
instance, when companies describe themselves as having a culture comprised 
of “digital natives.”66 By using this term to describe corporate culture and by 
advertising for “digital natives” or “new grads,”, companies deter older 
workers from applying. As the EEOC has previously advised that using 
59. Id.
60. Id. 
61. O’Connor, supra note 14. 
62. Id. 
63. Ina Jaffe, Older Workers Find Age Discrimination Built Right into Some Job Websites, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/03/28/521771515/older-workers-find-age-discrimination-built-right-into-
some-job-sites. 
64. Letters from Lisa Madigan, Att’y Gen., Ill., to Online Hiring Agencies (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://media.npr.org/assets/news/2017/03/letters.pdf. 
65. Jaffe, supra note 63. 
66. Vivian Giang, This is the Latest Way Employers Mask Age Bias, Lawyers Say, FORBES (May 
4, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/04/digital-native-employers-bias/. 
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phrases like “college student,” “recent college graduate,” and “young blood” 
could violate the ADEA,67 some scholars have also argued that the term 
“digital native,” implying that the applicant has been exposed to new digital 
technologies from an early age, falls in the realm of discriminatory 
language.68 It is problematic when corporations use this genre of terms to 
define their cultures or conclude that an applicant is a “poor cultural fit” 
because the individual is not a “digital native.”69 
One prime example is the case of  Reid v. Google, in which a California 
man sued his former employer, Google, alleging age discrimination under the 
California Fair Employment and Housing Law (“FEHA”).70 After only 
receiving one performance review from Google during his employment from 
June 2002 to February 2004, Reid was described as having “an 
extraordinarily broad range of knowledge concerning Operations, 
Engineering in general and an aptitude and orientation towards operational 
and IT issues.”71 However, Reid’s manager also noted that “[a]dapting to 
Google culture is the primary task for the first year. . . [which includes] 
[y]ounger contributors, inexperienced first line managers, and the super-fast
pace.”72 At 50 years old, Reid also stated he often felt other employees made
derogatory age-related remarks about his speed at work and the relevance of
his opinions.73 In 2004, Google terminated Reid, allegedly giving him no
rationale other than lack of “cultural fit.”74 Reid then sued Google for age
discrimination and the California Supreme Court ultimately ruled in his
favor, noting that stray remarks may be considered evidence of age
discrimination.75
Reid suggests that it may not be lawful for corporations to indicate that 
younger applicants might fit better for a company’s culture when advertising 
jobs online. The Society for Human Resource Management goes further, 
noting that advertising benefits such as “meals included” could be potentially 
discriminatory against older workers, as it seems to presume that the job 
applicant should not “have a family waiting for them to come home to 
dinner.”76 
67. Id. 
68. Jessica Sink and Richard A. Bales, Born in the Bandwidth: “Digital Native” as Pretext for Age 
Discrimination, 31 A.B.A. J. OF LAB. & EMP. L., 521-23 (2016). 
69. Giang, supra note 66. 
70. See Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 512, 516 (2008). 
71. Id. at 517. 
72. Id. at 518-19. 
73. Id. at 517-18. 
74. Id. at 519. 
75. Id. at 519, 543-46. 
76. See Kate Rockwood, Hiring in the Age of Ageism, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0218/pages/hiring-in-
the-age-of-ageism.aspx. 
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Age discrimination is even more of a problem for recruitment platforms 
like LinkedIn that request detailed information from job applicants that are 
made visible to all potential employers. Notably, the length of experience 
could negatively impact older applicants—with lengthier work experience 
sections acting as a proxy for age. The notion that employers might 
discriminate against an applicant with more experience is also not a new 
problem. In one 1980 case, Geller v. Markham, the Second Circuit ruled that 
employers could not set limits for how much experience applicants could 
have and that the school hiring only teachers with experience below a certain 
level was a violation of the ADEA.77 The court also held that the correlation 
between age and experience meant that this policy had a disparate impact on 
teachers over the age of 40.78 
However, the practice of culling applicants for having “too much 
experience” has not dissipated since that time. In January 2018, older workers 
began the “I, Too, Am Qualified” social media campaign to bring awareness 
to this persistent problem.79 Through this campaign, older workers around the 
country have begun to share their stories of age discrimination in the 
workplace, with the goal of creating change and letting other older workers 
know that they are not alone in the discrimination that they encounter. In one 
story, Colorado native Scott Croushore recounted looking for work as a 
technology consultant.80 As Croushore reached his late 40s, he noticed that it 
became more and more difficult to find work.81 As a test, Croushore slashed 
13 years of experience off his resume and recruiting profiles.82 To his 
surprise, he found work more quickly.83 
An additional issue with online recruiting platforms is the use of profile 
pictures to evaluate candidates. A paper published in the Journal of Social 
Psychological and Personality Science concluded that a person’s first 
interpretation of another individual’s profile picture is likely to stick, even 
after the two individuals meet in person.84 The paper suggests that this might 
be the case because an evaluator’s “photograph-based liking judgment[]” — 
snap judgment based on a profile picture — may affect how warmly the two 
77. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (1980).
78. Id. at 1032-33. 
79. See Michael Lindenberger & Nancy Fingerhood, I, Too, Am Qualified, WORDPRESS (Nov. 17, 
2017), https://itooamqualified.wordpress.com/2017/11/17/i-too-am-qualified/. 
80. Nell London, Older Workers Say Age Discrimination is Widespread, Though States Are Hard 





84. Gul Gunaydin, et al., Impressions Based on a Portrait Predict, 1-Month Later, Impressions 
Following a Live Interaction, 8 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 36, 41-42 (2016). 
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behave in person.85 Thus, when it comes to recruiting online, profile photos 
on such platforms as LinkedIn become vital information on which applicants 
are judged. 
Photos take on even more employment significance when we consider 
that LinkedIn estimates that “[a]dding a profile photo makes your profile 7x 
more likely to be found in searches.”86 Business experts believe that “[n]ot 
adding a photo to your LinkedIn profile could raise eyebrows and make 
employers wonder what you’re trying to hide.”87 In the online job recruiting 
culture, job applicants are thus faced with the Hobson’s choice of being 
judged by their profile photos or being viewed negatively if they do not post 
a photo. 
But, for older applicants, and especially women, judgments of physical 
appearance brings the risk of heightened bias.88 Profile photos present 
intersectional discrimination for women, as women are more likely to be held 
to youthful beauty standards.89 Age discrimination scholar Nicole Porter 
argues that because of “society’s biases and prejudices about the way women 
are supposed to look,” older women are disproportionately discriminated 
against in employment particularly due to their appearance.90 For older 
workers, the extensive past experiences they detail on these platforms, as well 
as their no longer youthful photos, may serve as proxies that allow for age 
discrimination on recruitment platforms. 
85. Id. at 41. 
86. Aaron Bronzan, Simple steps to a complete a LinkedIn Profile, OFFICIAL LINKEDIN BLOG (Feb. 
14, 2012), https://blog.linkedin.com/2012/02/14/profile-completeness. 
87. Jhaneel Lockhart, How Not Having a LinkedIn Photo Can Actually Hurt Your Job Search, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/putting-your-photo-on-linkedin-
wont-suddenly-expose-you-to-discrimination-2012-3. 
88. Consider that despite the efforts of the FCC, anchorwomen over age 40 experience 
intersectional sex plus age discrimination. “One only has to look as far as the television in one’s home to 
see an example of how the merging point of sexism and ageism has really affected older women.”  See 
Nicole B. Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 
79, _94_ (2003).  
89. “Middle-aged women emphasize that their appearance is more often evaluated than the 
appearance of men, which is why they try to maintain a young look. In the case of men, age is not a factor 
that could disqualify them in any area, including appearance.” Sociologist: Women judged more by their 
looks in various spheres of life, available at 
http://scienceinpoland.pap.pl/en/news/news%2C28321%2Csociologist-women-judged-more-their-looks-
various-spheres-life.html (discussing a study in which “sociologists from the University of Lodz 
conducted research on attractiveness among women and men in three age categories: young people (20-
37 years old); middle-aged (38-62 years old); and elderly (63-80 years old).” Id. The research showed, 
however, that “the attitudes towards appearance vary between age and sex groups. Women more often 
notice that they are judged by their appearance in various spheres of life more than men”). Id. See also, 
Katie Grant, Female Job Applicants Far More Likely To Be Judged On Appearance, THE INDEPENDENT 
(January 6, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/female-job-applicants-far-more-
likely-to-be-judged-on-appearance-study-finds-a6799856.html (discussing a study in which respondents 
looked at the social media pages of job applicants).  
90. See Porter, supra note 88, at 84. 
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In an effort to curb discrimination in employment, the AARP has created 
a pledge for employers to affirm that they “believe that 50+ workers should 
have a level playing field in their ability to compete for and obtain jobs” and 
agree to “recruit across diverse age groups and consider all applicants on an 
equal basis.”91 However, while some employers are taking these pledges and 
joining movements to end age discrimination, the existence of platforms as 
algorithmic intermediaries, means we must consider how and when the law 
should intervene. 
II. THE ADEA VERSUS PLATFORMS
Given the increased use of platforms in the recruitment and hiring 
process and their demonstrated ability to enable ageism, it seems then that 
there is no question as to whether the ADEA applies to platforms, but other 
laws such as the Communication Decency Act (the CDA) must be taken into 
account. It is unclear whether the ADEA is robust enough to address the 
amplified and sophisticated means to age discrimination afforded by 
platforms. Some courts have also begun to question whether online platforms 
occupy more than just the neutral role of a publisher or editor if they are 
effectively controlling the content that appears on their sites and the 
audiences who see it. In the subsections below, I discuss: 1) whether the 
ADEA applies to platforms; 2) the difficulties of proof in alleging age 
discrimination in relation to platforms (given that platforms enable the use of 
facially neutral proxies); and 3) whether there should be heightened 
responsibilities assigned to certain types of platforms that traffic in sensitive 
personal information. 
A. Does the ADEA Apply to Platforms?
When it comes to age discrimination enabled by platforms, a key 
threshold question is whether the ADEA applies. The ADEA does apply 
when the platform is actively shaping the information transmitted to a third 
party. Consider that in 2016, a complaint in the Eastern District of New York 
accused Facebook of aiding terrorist attacks.92 The plaintiffs in Cohen v. 
Facebook argued that Facebook’s machine-learning algorithm, which 
provides more visibility for stories that are receiving heightened media 
attention, aided the terrorist attacks through higher visibility and made 
Facebook complicit in the eventual harm.93 
91.  AARP Employer Pledge, AARP (2018),  
https://volunteers.aarp.org/employer-pledge-form/default.aspx; Employer Pledge Program, AARP 
(2018), https://www.aarp.org/work/job-search/employer-pledge-companies/. 
92. Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 146-47 (2017). 
93. Id. 
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Yet, under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)94, 
interactive service providers such as Facebook cannot be held liable for user-
generated content where the provider did not create or develop the content at 
issue.95 Section 230 also protects publishers and editors from the content they 
publish, holding that the posted content is the responsibility of the content 
creator alone. However, this case touched on a potential exemption of Section 
230, arguing that Facebook’s machine-learning algorithm has the power to 
personalize what content is shown by selecting which stories to display over 
others.96 In her article, Wild Westworld: The Application of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act to Social Networks’ Use of Machine Learning 
Algorithms, Professor Catherine Tremble argues that machine-learning 
algorithms that personalize content, such as Facebook’s, do not qualify for 
Section 230 immunity because they effectively become co-developers of the 
content by choosing what content is displayed and when.97 
The court in Cohen v. Facebook dismissed Cohen’s complaints, holding 
that Cohen failed to point to any direct injury to herself that was not also 
faced by the general public from Facebook’s algorithms.98 But other courts 
have found that platforms can be liable for discrimination when more 
personal information is required. For example, in a 2008 case, Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the CDA did not immunize the Fair Housing Council from liability 
arising from preferential questions used in housing surveys.99 In that case, 
plaintiffs took issue with Roommates.com requiring users to disclose 
personal information, including their sex, sexual orientations, and whether or 
not they had children.100 The court held that Roommates.com was not merely 
a provider of an interactive service, but had direct control over the content 
that they showed to other users.101 Under the CDA, then, Roommates.com 
was not only publishing information, but was helping to develop unlawful 
content.102 
Following the same logic, courts have recently begun to question 
whether the ADEA can also apply to online hiring platforms. At the root of 
this question is whether online hiring platforms are manipulating content 
such that they might be considered content developers under Section 230 the 
CDA. In Cramblett v. McHugh in 2014, the plaintiff argued he was not hired 
94. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
95. Catherine Tremble, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social Networks’ Use of 
Machine-Learning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 825 (2017) 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Cohen v. Facebook, 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 150-51. 
99. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167 (2008).
100. Id. at 1161-62. 
101. Id. at 1166. 
102. Id. 
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due to age discrimination and that a computerized algorithm had been used 
to weed out resumes with “insufficient qualifications,” which included 
candidates’ skills and past employment history.103 Cramblett argued that his 
age was a “substantial factor” taken into consideration by the algorithm that 
culled his application.104 The Ninth Circuit held, however, following the “but 
for” causation rule under Gross v. FBL Financial Services,105 that Cramblett’s 
showing that his age was a “substantial factor” was not enough to meet the 
standard of proof for age discrimination.106 Instead, to make his claim of age 
discrimination, Cramblett was required to show that “but for” his age, he 
would have been hired.107 
While Cramblett failed to meet this burden, his contention that he was 
culled by an algorithm as a consequence of his age could indicate a growing 
issue for employers as it relates to ADEA protections for job applicants. 
Cramblett’s claim, and others like it, may be bolstered in the future by stricter 
data documentation that could show age was a “but for” cause for the hiring 
decision. 
B. “But For” - Difficulties of Proof Under the ADEA
As Cramblett’s case implies, even in the event that the ADEA is found 
to apply to platforms, plaintiffs still must meet the higher “but for” standard 
of proof. This is because the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the 
standard which plaintiffs must meet when filing complaints under the ADEA 
in order to show age discrimination. The case, Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, held that a plaintiff needed to prove, “by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse 
employment action.”108 Gross drastically raised the standard of proof for 
ADEA age discrimination claims from the previous “motivating factor” 
standard.109 Thus Gross has made it much more difficult for plaintiffs to 
prove ADEA cases.110 
Melissa Hart has noted that the Supreme Court’s majority ruling in 
Gross overruled a twenty-year precedent to the detriment of labor and 
employment law plaintiffs.111 Furthermore, Hart writes that the Court’s 
103. Cramblett v. McHugh, No. 3:10-CV-54-PK, 2012 WL 7681280, at *18 (D. Or. Nov. 19, 2012).
104. Id. 
105. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
106. See Cramblett, 2012 WL 7681280 at *31.
107. Id.
108. Gross, 557 U.S. 167 at 180.
109. Id. at 175-77. 
110. Michael L. Foreman, Gross v. FBL Financial Services - Oh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 
681, 688 (2010). 
111. Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and Employment 
Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 265 (2009). 
18 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 40:1 
“casual, one-paragraph redefinition of what it means for an action to be taken 
‘because of’ a protected characteristic may well have consequences beyond 
the age discrimination context,”112 as the decision moves claims under the 
ADEA away from the Title VII standard of establishing discrimination 
(which can be proven by establishing a protected characteristic was a 
“motivating factor” in the adverse employment action).113 
Further, Hart shows that, because of this movement away from the Title 
VII standard, Gross calls into question the ability of ADEA plaintiffs to make 
mixed-motive claims.114 Mixed-motive claims are those in which plaintiffs 
argue that a protected characteristic was a motivating or substantial factor in 
an adverse employment action, even if other motivating factors used could 
have been lawful.115 Since Gross held that discrimination claims under the 
ADEA must show that the action would not have occurred “but-for” the 
consideration of the plaintiff’s age, making mixed-motive claims under the 
ADEA has become significantly more difficult, if not impossible.116 
Ultimately, this means that significantly fewer cases of age discrimination 
can be proven under the ADEA, because many employers might have used 
lawful considerations in addition to a plaintiff’s age when making 
employment decisions. 
Courts have also begun to defer to employers to show that they 
addressed “reasonable factors other than age” in their contested employment 
decisions. For example, in the 2016 case Villarreal v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, 
plaintiff Richard Villarreal applied for a territory sales manager job at 
Reynolds Tobacco via an online platform.117 He was 49 years old at the time 
he sent his application. After applying, Villarreal was never contacted, and 
he did not follow up with Reynolds.118 However, several years later, he 
learned that the company’s internal hiring guidelines described “targeted 
candidates” as those “2-3 years out of college” and that reviewers should 
“stay away from” applicants whose resumes showed that they had been “in 
112. Id. at 269. 
113. Id. at 270. 
114. Id. at 271. 
115. Id. at 265-66 
116. “In Gross, a five-justice majority concluded that the plaintiff had to carry the burden of 
persuasion at all times, that the burden never shifted to the defendant, and that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to a mixed-motive jury instruction under any circumstances in an ADEA claim.” Andrew M. Witko, 
Evolving Causation Standards and Their Post-Nassar Application to Retaliation Claims under the False 
Claims Act, 2 A.B.A. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 30, 288, 288 (2015). See also, Jessica M. Scales, Tipping the 
Balance Back: An Argument for the Mixed Motive Theory under the ADEA, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
229, 230, 240-42 (2010); Leigh A. Van Ostrand, A Close Look at ADEA Mixed-motives Claims And Gross 
V. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORD. L. REV. 399, 439-41 (2009); Ann Marie Tracey, Still Crazy After
All These Years? The ADEA, the Roberts Court, and Reclaiming Age Discrimination as Differential 
Treatment, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 609-10, 615-18 (2009) 
117. Villarreal v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016).
118. Id. 
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sales for 8-10 years.”119 After hearing about these internal guidelines, 
Villarreal filed suit alleging a violation of the ADEA.120 
In Villarreal, the majority effectively stated that, although Reynolds 
Tobacco had used discriminatory guidelines internally, Mr. Villarreal could 
not prove age discrimination because he did not diligently follow up 
regarding his application decision.121 Thus, the employment decision could 
have been made based on a number of factors other than Villarreal’s age.122 
The Villarreal decision indicates the court’s deference to the employer to 
show that a decision was made for “reasonable factors other than age.”123  
Reynolds did not have to show its decision was not discriminatory, but 
simply had to show that its decision could have been for other factors related 
to Villarreal’s application.124 Effectively, by linking Gross, in which 
plaintiffs must show age was the “but-for” factor in an adverse employment 
decision,125 and Villarreal, in which employers must simply show age was 
not the only factor in their decisions,126 courts have made it very difficult for 
plaintiffs to prove ADEA violations. 
Thus, courts’ changes in ADEA standards have done nothing to mitigate 
existing factors127 that have made proving ADEA claims exceedingly 
difficult. For example, recently terminated workers of Spirit AeroSystems 
have found their age discrimination claims very difficult to prove because 
“[e]ven companies that decide that older workers are too expensive, with 
their larger paychecks and costlier health insurance, rarely detail this in 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. See id. at 970-72. 
122. See id. 
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
124. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 971-72. 
125. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
126. Supra note 124. 
127. Another major factor involved in proving ADEA claims revolves around the employers’
replacement of the affected employee. For example, in Merrick v. Hilton Worldwide, an employee had 
difficulty proving a prima facie age discrimination claim in district court because he was required to show 
he was “(1) at least forty years old, (2) performing his job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) either 
replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under 
circumstances otherwise ‘giving rise to an inference of discrimination.’” While Merrick was able to 
adequately affirm the first three qualifications, the district court found he was not able to show he was 
replaced by someone substantially younger than him. Merrick’s replacement was somewhat complicated. 
When Merrick was terminated, he was replaced by an employee who was 15-years younger than him, 
which seemingly should have met the burden of being replaced by someone substantially younger. 
However, Merrick’s duties were only partially given to this younger employee. As opposed to being fully 
replaced, many of Merrick’s duties were outsourced. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s holding, finding that Merrick did not have to show that he was replaced because he was laid off in 
a reduction-in-workforce. Merrick v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 867 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2017). However, 
this case highlights a potential problem for many employees whose jobs might be outsourced. Even though 
employees may be targeted for termination because of their age, they may not be able to prove they were 
replaced by someone substantially younger. 
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internal documents or emails.”128 Additional issues with proving ADEA 
claims include the costs of the lawsuits and the time it takes to try them.129 
C. The Responsibility of Platforms as Information Fiduciaries
An additional theory that could hold platforms liable for age 
discrimination positions their creators as information fiduciaries who can be 
held liable for age discrimination on their platforms. In his article, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, Jack Balkin defines 
information fiduciaries as entities “who, because of their relationship with 
another, [assume] special duties with respect to the information they obtain 
in the course of the relationship.”130 He compares these online companies to 
traditional fiduciaries, like doctors and lawyers, who have the duty not to 
disclose sensitive information about their clients.131 Balkin primarily believes 
that this relationship is necessary because these service providers rely on the 
trust of their clients, and are thus theoretically deterred from misusing the 
information that they obtain.132 However, online information fiduciaries have 
a much wider scope than traditional fiduciaries due to the reach of the 
internet. By way of online platforms, these fiduciary relationships are 
widespread, and include companies that are “increasingly using sophisticated 
algorithms and forms of artificial intelligence to make decisions about people 
in areas ranging from advertising to employment to policing to credit.”133 
Considered in the context of employment, one primary question has 
arisen: where do the responsibilities of these fiduciaries lie with regard to the 
information they receive? More specifically, does the information fiduciary 
hold any responsibility for creating categories of information or designing its 
platform in such a way as to capture categories of information, some of which 
may be considered protected information? Some legal scholars have noted 
that platforms, which might be considered information fiduciaries because of 
the amount and type of information they collect from potential job applicants, 
“can control who is matched with whom for various forms of exchange, what 
information users have about one another during their interactions, and how 
indicators of reliability and reputation are made salient.”134 
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Here, following Professor Balkin’s analogy from above,135 it might be 
helpful to draw a comparison between the relationship of online hiring 
platforms and their users to the relationship that patients have with both 
doctors and nurses. The role of the online hiring platform might be compared 
to that of a nurse, who goes through records and conducts a preliminary 
check-up, determining what the cause of a patient’s sickness might be before 
bringing in a doctor. Then, the information is passed to a doctor, or the 
employer in this analogy, to conduct a more in-depth review of the patient’s 
condition. This is the function that an online hiring platform might fulfill 
before passing on information to a hiring manager. In both situations, parties 
retain sensitive information internally, for their own use. Thus, one might 
argue that, like an information fiduciary, an online hiring platform has an 
obligation to act in the interests of its clients.136 
As other scholars have noted, these platforms “necessarily exercise a 
great deal of control over how users’ encounters are structured.”137 In 
evaluating certain design policy choices made by platform creators, such as 
what information might be requested or how the platform is structured to 
allow certain types of information and not others, it becomes clear that 
platforms shape the amount of information their users can learn about one 
another and how they are to do so.138  Harkening back to the example of 
limited dates on drop down birthdate data fields described above,139 a given 
platform’s design choices can exacerbate age discrimination. Thus, some 
argue, platforms should not be held completely blameless for discrimination, 
even if their users may be influenced by pre-existing biases.140 Rather, the 
law should recognize platform authoritarianism as a socio-technical 
phenomenon that changes both the responsibility and liability of platforms. 
Scholars have challenged the “dominant position in the legal literature 
that [increased] transparency will solve [the] problem” of algorithmic bias.141 
While the scholars recognize that “the accountability mechanisms and legal 
standards that govern [algorithmic decisions] have not kept pace with 
technology,” they believe that the only way to fix the issues with technology 
is by deploying further technological solutions.142 One suggestion for 
preventing discrimination in hiring is to create a method whereby technology 
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can show that a particular algorithm “does not directly use sensitive or 
prohibited classes of information.”143 
In response, Professor Pauline Kim argues that technical “checks” on 
the decision process like randomization or predefining constraints cannot 
solve the entire problem at hand.144 Instead, Professor Kim argues that 
“causes of bias often lie not in the code, but in broader social processes.”145 
The true issue is classification bias, which requires outside scrutiny. For 
example, third parties could examine computer code or the decision criteria 
it implements to detect biases.146 
Although elsewhere I have also argued for third party audits similar to 
those envisioned by Professor Pauline Kim,147 I also believe that the 
responsibility to prevent algorithmic bias and disparate impacts rests on both 
the employer and platform creator. Indeed, there are many checks that both 
parties might take to ensure equal opportunity for all workers in the future, 
such as ending the separation of job categories by age, checking for the use 
of age-related proxies in job advertisement and by platforms, and subjecting 
employment data to external audits. 
The controversy over whether to hold platform creators responsible for 
the discrimination that occurs on their sites involves the question of how 
much control these online hiring platforms exercise over the type of 
information to be collected and how that information is used. In some cases, 
it seems the platforms themselves may not have much control over what 
information they intake and the criteria imposed by employers in searching 
for applicants.148 Professor Kim writes that one of the major problems in 
relying on the conviction of these hiring platforms is “classification bias,” 
essentially that the information they receive is either biased to begin with or 
is ordered by a third party to be classified into prohibited characteristics such 
as race or sex.149 In such a scenario, this might be the reason to make an 
argument against assigning liability for discriminatory outcomes to the 
platform as an information fiduciary if the platform only takes an 
administrative role in sorting through applications based on an employer’s 
preferences. 
Thus, the liability of platforms hinges on the amount of control they 
exact over determining what sensitive information to collect or over how to 
classify candidates. As in Fair Housing Council where the court held 
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Roomates.com could be considered a content creator rather than merely a 
publisher, the ADEA should be extended to automated hiring platforms, 
when, as detailed previously, they actively shape the content that users see, 
and such content is specifically the type of content that might be used for age 
discrimination in employment.150 
III. SOME PROPOSALS FOR TACKLING AGE DISCRIMINATION BY
PLATFORMS 
In this section, I offer three proposals for curbing platform-enabled age 
discrimination in employment. First, because of the difficulty of proving 
disparate treatment, which typically would require hard evidence of an 
individual targeted for age discrimination, advocates should attempt to 
reinforce the disparate impact cause of action for the ADEA via codification. 
Second, given the issues of ageist language on online hiring platforms, such 
as the use of terms like “digital natives,” the EEOC should provide 
educational guidelines for employers regarding the use of ageist language or 
other age proxies in job ads. Finally, with an aim to facilitate disparate impact 
claims aimed at curbing age discrimination, the EEOC should consider 
implementing guidelines for the documentation of criteria used to determine 
suitable applicants and for more stringent data retention on job 
advertisement, recruitment, and hiring platforms. 
A. Strengthen the ADEA by Codifying the Disparate Impact Cause of Action
Strengthening the ADEA with a disparate impact cause of action could
help stem age discrimination in employment via platforms. Several legal 
scholars have analyzed how the frameworks courts use to evaluate 
discrimination claims impact their success.151 The lack of a codified disparate 
impact cause of action is an impediment to plaintiffs seeking redress for 
platform-enabled age discrimination. The codification of a disparate impact 
cause of action would provide another avenue of proof for plaintiffs. For one, 
in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Circuit 
was incorrect “to hold that the disparate impact theory of liability was 
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categorically unavailable under the ADEA.152 While courts have concluded 
that, even in the absence of statutory language, the ADEA does allow for 
disparate impact claims, codification would provide greater protection to 
workers and job applicants. 
Legal scholars have written about arguments for and against adding a 
disparate impact clause into the ADEA. For example, Professor Henry 
Pfutzenreuter noted that “given the textual similarities between Title VII and 
the ADEA, courts [could apply] the same standards to both acts.”153 In fact, 
in the Smith decision, Justice Stevens identified that the two were almost 
completely identical in their text and structure.154 However, because not all 
courts agree on the availability of implicit ADEA relief under a disparate 
impact theory for victims of age discrimination, some legal scholars have 
argued that the risk of the theory’s obsolescence for the ADEA is high.155 
Professor Pfutzenreuter proposes a balancing approach between a 
Reasonable Factor Other than Age (RFOA) defense and a disparate impact 
defense.156 Arguing that the minimal threshold for finding a RFOA is too low, 
Professor Pfutzenreuter suggests courts should instead try to balance the 
“reasonableness” of an employer’s reliance on a factor other than age and 
then consider discrimination at an implicit level.157 Overall, he concludes that 
a solution is needed to fix the current inability of plaintiffs to find 
discriminatory impact relief under the ADEA. 
Following the same logic, Professor Michael Harper argues that the 
ADEA should be amended to provide the same procedural strengths that Title 
VII provides.158 Harper’s reasoning arises from “the obvious relative 
weakness of the nation’s regulation of age discrimination in employment” 
and the lack of effort of the then-Obama administration to combat the 
confusion surrounding the issue of disparate impact arising from recent court 
decisions.159 Further, Harper observes that “the continuing gap between the 
ADEA and Title VII may reflect assumptions that age discrimination is less 
likely to be malignly motivated” than the other protected classes–a statement 
which he suggests may be true.160 However, Harper notes that the motivation 
does not make age discrimination in employment any less serious than the 
forms of discrimination proscribed by Title VII.161 Following this reasoning, 
152. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
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Harper calls for damage remedies, class actions, defenses to disparate impact 
actions, and causation standards for disparate treatment actions under the 
ADEA, in line with the protections granted by Title VII.162 
Professor Judith Johnson argues that because employers are more 
frequently using age-correlated criteria to make employment decisions that 
are “opportunistic” for their bottom lines, a solution is necessary to combat 
“exactly [the age discrimination that] the ADEA was designed to prevent.”163 
To alleviate this issue, Professor Johnson proposes a two-stage solution 
“apply[ing] the disparate impact theory to the ADEA, which would require 
an employer to justify the use of an age-correlated factor that would have a 
disparate impact on older workers.”164 To do so, Professor Johnson proposes 
that the employer should be required to bear the burden of persuasion that the 
use of any age-correlated factor that selects out older workers, such as high 
salary, is justified as a “reasonable factor other than age.”165 This solution 
would effectively make it more difficult for courts to simply defer to 
employers who might point to an RFOA explanation without legitimate proof 
that the qualification is “reasonable.” 
Professor Sandra Sperino notably criticizes the idea of liability for 
discrimination arising from separate frameworks, questioning whether courts 
should even “use frameworks to conceptualize discrimination in the first 
place.”166 Her central argument revolves around the idea that “faulty sorting 
contributes to stereotyping and societal discrimination” and that by sorting 
cases into frameworks, courts themselves are operating by the same 
discriminatory principles that are questioned in the cases they are trying to 
solve.167 Professor Sperino does not suggest a return to traditional claims of 
discriminatory impact, but instead relies on a simpler solution whereby courts 
carefully follow elements of proof for any discrimination case as defined by 
the key statutory language in the antidiscrimination statute.168 
I argue that the ADEA would be more effective with a disparate cause 
of action and its procedures written into the statute. Such codification would 
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standardize the use of a disparate impact theory of action for age 
discrimination cases, thus alleviating confusion as to how the disparate 
impact theory would be applied and also encouraging would-be plaintiffs to 
file claims under the disparate impact theory. As some scholars have noted, 
the language of the ADEA is in parallel with that of the Title VII, which does 
have a codified disparate impact cause of action.169 One could argue then that 
the similarity between the two statutes means the omission of the disparate 
impact cause of action was deliberate.170 But, I argue the omission was merely 
an oversight that should be remedied, particularly in light of recent decisions 
like Smith that have come out in favor of a disparate impact cause of action 
for the ADEA. 
B. EEOC Education For Employers Regarding Ageist Language In Job
Advertisements 
Another proposal to curb age discrimination caused by online platforms 
is the release of EEOC guidelines to educate employers on ageist language 
in job advertisements. A search of the EEOC website reveals no such existing 
guidelines.171 As previously described, job advertisements on platforms are 
rife with descriptions such as “digital native” or “recent graduate.”172 A 
generous interpretation of this phenomenon is that employers truly may not 
understand how such language might dissuade older job applicants. Whether 
or not this is the case, EEOC guidelines that clarify what might be classified 
as ageist language in advertisements and resume screening would help 
employers and plaintiffs seeking to bring suit when they suspect the 
occurrence of age discrimination on platforms. 
C. EEOC Guidelines for Design of Hiring Platforms and Their Data
Collection Practices 
An EEOC-led effort to combat age discrimination enabled by work 
platforms should include evidence-backed guidelines for the design of hiring 
platforms. These design guidelines would, for example, address user 
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interfaces that are more difficult for older workers to use, such as those with 
small print or drop-down menus for birthdates or graduation years, for 
example, that exclude options for older applicants.173 I would also propose 
that the EEOC set forth guidelines for data collection practices by platforms 
that instruct them to prohibit data collection that can be used as proxies 
against older workers. 
CONCLUSION 
Age discrimination is not merely a matter of the violation of established 
law; rather, it is a societal issue that goes to the very survival of elderly 
people. Consider that on the island of Keos in the Aegean Sea, when the 
island was besieged and its residents were slowly being starved by the 
Athenians, the island residents responded by voting that those over sixty 
years old must commit suicide by drinking hemlock.174 And according to 
Greek mythology, on the island of Sardinia, sons slew their elderly fathers, 
as human sacrifices to the god of time, Cronus.175 A rule of law that respects 
the worth of geriatric human life, coupled with technological advances in 
healthcare mean that humans now live much longer than before. Thus, 
excluding older workers from gainful employment is akin to the senicide act 
of sending them into the open sea on a raft with no provisions. Age 
discrimination on job seeking platforms is increasingly well documented, 
particularly in regards to design elements and functionality that redline, cull, 
or dissuade older job applicants. To preserve equal opportunity for 
employment, the law must attend to the new avenues for age discrimination 
now presented by the technological capabilities of platforms. The three-part 
proposal I have set forth will help to combat age discrimination in the face of 
platform authoritarianism.  
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